

MULTIPLE-CHOICE QUESTIONS

Each question has only one correct answer, which ought to be clearly pointed out with an 'X'. Each question incorrectly answered will be evaluated as minus one third of the mark obtained had it been correctly answered.

1.- Time stamping authorities:

- Need to know the contents of the message to issue its time stamp.
- May issue the time stamp by concatenating the message with the date and time.
- Take the date and time data from a trusted source.**

2.- The set of specifications developed by the IETF PKIX group:

- They are the same that the ones developed by ISO/IEC under the X.509 identifier.
- One of them follows partially the ISO/IEC X.509 Recommendation.**
- None of them is based on the ISO/IEC X.509 Recommendation.

3. - The purpose of the specification ETSI TS 101 903 XML Advanced Electronic Signatures (XAdES) is:

- To define a set of XML formats for the signatures used in the SET protocol
- To define a set of XML formats for signatures that remain valid over long periods**
- To define a set of XML formats for signatures that must be used to create electronic invoices

4.- SSL:

- Does not allow data compression.
- Supports RSA and DH as public key algorithms.**
- SSL acceleration is usually performed at client's side to make up for its usually less computing power.

5.- SET:

- It is relatively simple and has a low consumption of computer resources.
- Demands all the participants to have an X.509 public-key certificate.**
- Simplifies the process of authenticating the client by using a password instead of public key certificates.

6.- 3D-Secure:

- Uses the mechanism known as dual signature to provide non-repudiation.
- Requires the merchant and the buyer to install specific software.
- Helps issuer to verify that the person making an e-commerce purchase is an authorized cardholder.**

Question 1 . Next figures show the different steps of the purchase process followed in certain virtual shop. Answer the following questions:

- Mention existing security elements and assess the global security level that a typical user may sense.
- List security services (not protocols) that have not been considered in this process (a maximum of three). Explain why they are important.
- Do you miss the mandatory mention of some law?
- Enumerate a maximum of five issues not specifically related to security that have an influence on the sensed security/insecurity. Do you miss some external endorsement that may help to increase the potential buyer's trust?




Figure 1. Product information




Figure 2. Purchase process, step 1. Creation of an account.




Figure 3. Purchase process, step 2. Confirmation of delivery information




Figure 4. Purchase process, step 3. Selection of payment method




Figure 5. Purchase process, step 4. Purchase request confirmation

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


Figure 6. Payment details using 4B payment system.

SOLUTION:

- a) The SSL socket is only established in the payment process. However, personal data is sent during the process. This fact, along with the comments that will be shown in the following parts of this exercise, leads to a low confidence level.
- b)
 - Data encryption, to avoid unauthorized access by third parties.
 - Data integrity, to avoid message alteration during its transmission
 - Server authentication, to be sure that the server is who it claims to be.
- c) At least, the European Directive on Personal Data Protection (or, equivalently, the Spanish Data Protection Law) should be mentioned. Moreover, there are other legal references that could be introduced as well – the Spanish Information Society and E-Commerce Services Law).
- d) There are several issues to be commented:
 - The total amount is not correct – VAT is not included in it.
 - There are several uncommon words (like “Suburbio”).

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- There are several spelling mistakes
- The purchase reference is not user friendly
- There are some fields that could lead to misunderstandings – i.e. FCad.
- There are English sentences inserted in the Spanish text.
- The date does not appear in any screen

Some good practice examples could be the following ones:

- Price calculation clearly stated

The screenshot shows a payment page with a 'Resumen de la cesta' (Shopping Cart Summary) on the right side, highlighted with a red box. The summary includes the product 'Inspiron Mini10v (M08B1001)', quantity 1, subtotal 249.01 €, and total with IVA 278.01 €. The left side shows the payment form with fields for card type (Visa), number (9700604432133336), expiration date (07/09), and name (A. BRAVO).


Item	Price
Subtotal	249,01 €
Total sin IVA	214,66 €
IVA (16,00%)	29,00 €
Total con IVA	249,01 €
Gastos de entrega totales	29,00 €
Precio total	278,01 €

- Using external confidence seals (like Confianza online, Verisign seal, etc.)


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- Use of EV-SSL



- Reference to the Agreement conditions, the Terms of use and the privacy policy

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Renfe Compra de Billetes - Venta Online - Windows Internet Explorer

https://wl.renfe.es/vol/index-Home.do

Renfe Compra de Billetes - Venta Online

Cambios de billetes | Reembolsos de billetes | Cierre billetes (ida y vuelta) | Abono Tarjeta Plus | Preguntas más frecuentes

Origen: MADRID (*)
Destino: TARRAGONA (CAMP TARRAGONA)
Salida: 12-01-2010
Regreso: 22-01-2010
Número Viajeros: 1
Nueva Búsqueda

Solicitud de preferencias para realizar el viaje **Solicitar Preferencias**

Datos del Comprador

Correo Electrónico (*)
Nombre (*)
Apellido 1 (*)
Apellido 2
Tipo de Documento (*) NIF Número Documento (*)
Dirección Código Postal
Población (*) Provincia (*) País (*) España
Teléfono 1 (*) Teléfono 2

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He leído y acepto las Condiciones Generales Viajeros y las Condiciones Generales de la Venta y la Política de Privacidad

Selección su forma de Pago Tarjeta de Crédito / Débito

Número de Tarjeta (*) Fecha de Caducidad (*)
Titular de la Tarjeta (*) CVV / CID: (*)
Los campos marcados con asterisco (*) son obligatorios. Si eres titular de Renfe Visa pincha aquí

Si posee tarjeta de fidelización y ha adquirido billetes para trenes AVE
Número de tarjeta CLUB AVE para la plaza 1:

Comprar

Internet | Modo protegido: activado

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Question 2 - Describe in detail the process that has to be followed to validate an X.509 public key certificate.

Check the following issues:

- Cryptographically valid signature of the certificate using issuer's public key
- Correct validity period
- Compliance with critical extensions
- Appropriate intended purpose
- Adequacy of other policy constraints
- It has not been revoked or suspended
- Validate issuer's public key certificate and all the public key certificates of the certification path (check the same previous issues for each certificate).
- Check that the names in the certificates must be consistent with a valid certification path, that is, the subject of every certificate (except the last) is the issuer of the next certificate.
- Check appropriate trust of root certificate (last certificate in the certification path).

Question 3 – During the process of retrieving a web page from a web server using an SSL connection during Christmas Eve of 2009, you receive the certificate shown below. Mention several reasons to not trust this certificate. Mention also if some of the used algorithms is considered insecure nowadays.

Certificate:

Data:

```
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 65 (0x41)
Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: C=US, O=Equifax Secure Inc., CN=Equifax Secure Global eBusiness CA-1
Validity
  Not Before: Jul 31 00:00:00 2004 GMT
  Not After : Sep  2 00:00:00 2004 GMT
Subject: CN=MD5 Collisions Inc. (http://www.phreedom.org/md5)
Subject Public Key Info:
  Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
  RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)
    Modulus (1024 bit):
      00:ba:a6:59:c9:2c:28:d6:2a:b0:f8:ed:9f:46:a4:
      a4:37:ee:0e:19:68:59:d1:b3:03:99:51:d6:16:9a:
      5e:37:6b:15:e0:0e:4b:f5:84:64:f8:a3:db:41:6f:
      35:d5:9b:15:1f:db:c4:38:52:70:81:97:5e:8f:a0:
      b5:f7:7e:39:f0:32:ac:1e:ad:44:d2:b3:fa:48:c3:
      ce:91:9b:ec:f4:9c:7c:e1:5a:f5:c8:37:6b:9a:83:
      de:e7:ca:20:97:31:42:73:15:91:68:f4:88:af:f9:
      28:28:c5:e9:0f:73:b0:17:4b:13:4c:99:75:d0:44:
      e6:7e:08:6c:1a:f2:4f:1b:41
    Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
  X509v3 Key Usage:
```

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```
CRL Sign
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:FALSE
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
A7:04:60:1F:AB:72:43:08:C5:7F:08:90:55:56:1C:D6:CE:E6:38:EB
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:BE:A8:A0:74:72:50:6B:44:B7:C9:23:D8:FB:A8:FF:B3:57:6B:68:6C

Netscape Comment:
3
Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption
a7:21:02:8d:d1:0e:a2:80:77:25:fd:43:60:15:8f:ec:ef:90:
47:d4:84:42:15:26:11:1c:cd:c2:3c:10:29:a9:b6:df:ab:57:
75:91:da:e5:2b:b3:90:45:1c:30:63:56:3f:8a:d9:50:fa:ed:
58:6c:c0:65:ac:66:57:de:1c:c6:76:3b:f5:00:0e:8e:45:ce:
7f:4c:90:ec:2b:c6:cd:b3:b4:8f:62:d0:fe:b7:c5:26:72:44:
ed:f6:98:5b:ae:cb:d1:95:f5:da:08:be:68:46:b1:75:c8:ec:
1d:8f:1e:7a:94:f1:aa:53:78:a2:45:ae:54:ea:d1:9e:74:c8:
76:67
```

SOLUTION:

Certificate:

Data:

```
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 65 (0x41)
Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption
```

Issuer: C=US, O=Equifax Secure Inc., CN=Equifax Secure Global eBusiness CA-1

Validity

```
Not Before: Jul 31 00:00:00 2004 GMT
Not After : Sep 2 00:00:00 2004 GMT
```

Subject: C=MD5 Collisions Inc. (<http://www.phreedom.org/md5>)

Subject Public Key Info:

```
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)
Modulus (1024 bit):
00:ba:a6:59:c9:2c:28:d6:2a:b0:f8:ed:9f:46:a4:
a4:37:ee:0e:19:68:59:d1:b3:03:99:51:d6:16:9a:
5e:37:6b:15:e0:0e:4b:f5:84:64:f8:a3:db:41:6f:
35:d5:9b:15:1f:db:c4:38:52:70:81:97:5e:8f:a0:
b5:f7:7e:39:f0:32:ac:1e:ad:44:d2:b3:fa:48:c3:
ce:91:9b:ec:f4:9c:7c:e1:5a:f5:c8:37:6b:9a:83:
de:e7:ca:20:97:31:42:73:15:91:68:f4:88:af:f9:
28:28:c5:e9:0f:73:b0:17:4b:13:4c:99:75:d0:44:
e6:7e:08:6c:1a:f2:4f:1b:41
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
```

X509v3 extensions:

```
X509v3 Key Usage:
CRL Sign
```

```
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:FALSE
```

```
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
A7:04:60:1F:AB:72:43:08:C5:7F:08:90:55:56:1C:D6:CE:E6:38:EB
```

```
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:BE:A8:A0:74:72:50:6B:44:B7:C9:23:D8:FB:A8:FF:B3:57:6B:68:6C
```

Netscape Comment:

3

```
Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption
a7:21:02:8d:d1:0e:a2:80:77:25:fd:43:60:15:8f:ec:ef:90:
47:d4:84:42:15:26:11:1c:cd:c2:3c:10:29:a9:b6:df:ab:57:
75:91:da:e5:2b:b3:90:45:1c:30:63:56:3f:8a:d9:50:fa:ed:
58:6c:c0:65:ac:66:57:de:1c:c6:76:3b:f5:00:0e:8e:45:ce:
7f:4c:90:ec:2b:c6:cd:b3:b4:8f:62:d0:fe:b7:c5:26:72:44:
```

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ed:f6:98:5b:ae:cb:d1:95:f5:da:08:be:68:46:b1:75:c8:ec:
1d:8f:1e:7a:94:f1:aa:53:78:a2:45:ae:54:ea:d1:9e:74:c8:
76:67

Question 4 - Explain the circumstances that lead to a successful Lebanese Loop attack at an ATM. What countermeasures can be applied?

It is critical for a Lebanese Loop attack to success that victim trusts attacker and gives him/her the PIN of the victim's credit card.

The most important countermeasures are to make users aware of the threats and educate them to safeguard their personal information while transacting at the ATM or on the Internet and prevent them from the possible frauds and attacks that are being committed

Problem 1 The protocol 3-D Secure by VISA™ allows the payment within e-commerce transactions. The entity known as Access Control Server (ACS) in this protocol has as main goal to authenticate the buyer in the transaction. As a result of the authentication process, the ACS sends a signed message (M1) to the merchant who verifies it. After interbank communications finish, the merchant sends the buyer an encrypted message (M2) showing the result of the purchase. As part of VISA's auditing process, we require you to check the following issues:

1. Message M1 comprises the following data items:
 - a. Date: 20012010
 - b. PAN: 1701001012211001

The signature algorithm is RSA.

The public key of the ACS is: $K_p(\text{ACS}) = (e=13, n=91)$

The hash algorithm applied on the numeric data items of M1 works as follows: First, each data item is divided in groups of two digits. Then, it is calculated the sum of the set of two digits numbers identified in the previous step (for example: if data item is '4432', the resulting sum will be '76'). The hash of the complete message M1 is calculated by summing up the hashes of each data item and applying modulo operation with modulus 91.

Check if 32 is the correct signature over message M1.

2. Message M2 comprises the following data items:
 - a. Date: 17

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b. Price: 18

Encrypt message M2. Take into account the following information regarding the keys:

$K_p(\text{merchant's public key}) = (e = 32, n = 64)$; $K_v(\text{buyer's private key}) = (d = 37, n = 143)$

3. Forget the results obtained in the previous question of the problem. Suppose that message M2 only comprises a data item indicating the hour. Let 92 be the resulting ciphertext after encrypting message M2 using the keys previously specified in question 2. **Decrypt the ciphertext and explain briefly whether you consider reasonable or not the result of the decryption process.**

RSA operations reminder:

Sign / Decrypt: Result = $M^d \bmod n$

Verify / Encrypt: Result = $M^e \bmod n$

SOLUTION

1. $\text{Hash}(M1) = 17+1+0+10+12+21+10+1+20+1+20+10 \bmod 91 = 123 \bmod 91 = 32$

We have to check that:

$32 = 32^e \bmod n = 32^{13} \bmod 91 = 32$. The signature is correct, as the following expression holds:

$$32 = 32 \bmod 91$$

2.

$$K_p(\text{Client}) = (e = 13, n = 143)$$

$$M2_1 = 17^{13} \bmod 143 = 95$$

$$M2_2 = 18^{13} \bmod 143 = 57$$

$$\text{Encryption}(M2) = M2_1 || M2_2 = 95 || 57$$

(The message must be divided because it cannot be sent at once. The modulo, 143, makes it impossible).

3.

Decryption of 92:

$$\text{Decrypted} = 92^{37} \bmod 143 = 27.$$

27 is not a valid hour, as the day has 24 hours. This error could be due to:

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- **An incorrect sender configuration**
- **A malicious message alteration. Integrity cannot be assumed in this scenario – it is not explicitly stated in the problem description.**
- **A malicious third party, that has injected the message in the channel.**